Phil 2151: Philosophy of Mind
University of Minnesota, Morris
Professor Collier

Course Description: What is the place of the mind in the physical universe? Can it really be the case that consciousness is nothing but a brain state? What are emotions? Might psychology be eliminated by neuroscience? Is artificial intelligence possible? These are just some of the questions that we will ask in this course, which provides a broad introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.
Class Schedule
1. Introduction
Pryor: "Philosophical Terms and Methods"
2. Substance Dualism
Kim: "Substance Dualism" (30-37, 40-53)
3. Epiphenomenalism
Descartes: Selections from Discourse on Method
Huxley: "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History"
4. Logical Behaviorism
Skinner: Selections from Science and Human Behavior
Hempel: "Logical Analysis of Psychology"
5. Rylean Behaviorism
Ryle: "Descartes' Myth"; "Knowing How and Knowing That"; "Dispositions and Occurrences"; "Self-Knowledge"
6. Central State Materialism
Armstrong: "The Nature of Mind"
7. Identity Theory
Smart: "Sensations and Brain Processes"
Place: "The Physiological Explanation of Introspection and the Phenomenological Fallacy"
8. Artificial Intelligence
Turing: "Computing Machinery and Intelligence"
9. Machine Functionalism
Putnam: "The Nature of Mental States"
10. Challenge to Functionalism
Searle: "Minds, Brains, and Programs"
FIRST EXAM
11. Intentionality
Chisholm: "Intentional Inexistence"
Dretske: "A Recipe for Thought"
12. Meaning Externalism
Putnam: "Brains in a Vat"
13. Active Externalism
Clark and Chalmers: "The Extended Mind"
14. Emotions as Feelings
James: "What is an Emotion?"
15. Emotions as Judgments
Pitcher: "Emotion" (326-342)
16. Emotions and Embodiment
Prinz: "Emotions Embodied"
17. Eliminative Materialism
Feyeraband: "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem"
Churchland:
"Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" (67-76, 84-90)
18. Eliminative Materialism II
Stich: "Future of Folk Psychology"
19. Instrumentalism
Dennett: "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology"
20. Realism
Fodor: "The Persistence of the Attitudes"
SECOND EXAM
21. Qualia
Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat?"
22. Knowledge Argument
Jackson: "Epiphenomenal Qualia"
23. Modal Argument
Kripke: Selections from ‘Identity and Necessity’
24. Explanatory Gap
Levine: "Materialism and Qualia, The Explanatory Gap"
25. Mysterianism
McGinn: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?"
26. The Hard Problem [Second paper due]
Chalmers: "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" (102-108)
27. Materialist Replies and Return of Dualism [Group Presentations]
Chalmers: "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" (108-115, 119-135)
THIRD EXAM
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