Phil 2151: Philosophy of Mind - Minds, Brains, and Computers

University of Minnesota, Morris
2013
Professor Collier

Course Description: What is the place of the mind in the physical world? Could it really be the case that consciousness is nothing but a brain process? Will psychology be eliminated by future neuroscience? Is artificial intelligence possible? These are some of the questions that we will ask in this course, which serves as an introduction to the philosophy of mind.

Course Requirements: Evaluation will be based on three exams (15% each), two papers (15% each) and class participation (25%). The readings for this course are available at JSTOR or Briggs e-reserve.

Course Syllabus

Second Paper Topics

Class Schedule

Introduction

Pryor: Philosophical Terms and Methods

Substance Dualism

Descartes: Selections from Principles of Philosophy

Kim: "Substance Dualism"

Epiphenomenalism

Descartes: Selections from Discourse on Method

Huxley: "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History"

Logical Behaviorism

Hempel: "Logical Analysis of Psychology"

Logical Behaviorism II

Ryle: Selections from The Concept of Mind (Morton Text book)

Ryle: "Self-Knowledge"; emotions

Emotions I

James: "What is an Emotion?"

Emotions II

Pitcher: "Emotion"

Central State Materialism

Armstrong: "The Nature of Mind"

Identity Theory

Smart: "Sensations and Brain Processes"

FIRST EXAM

Artificial Intelligence

Turing: "Computing Machinery and Intelligence"

Machine Functionalism

Putnam: "The Nature of Mental States"

Analytic Functionalism

Lewis: "Mad Pain, Martian Pain"

Challenge to Functionalism

Searle: "Minds, Brains, and Programs"

Intentionality

Fodor: Selections from "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" (Morton Text Book)

Putnam: Selections from Reason, Truth, and History (Morton Text Book)

Self-Knowledge

Putnam: "Meaning and Reference"

Self-Knowledge II

Burge: "Individualism and Self-Knowledge"

SECOND EXAM

Qualia

Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat?"

Knowledge Argument

Jackson: "Epiphenomenal Qualia"

Modal Argument

Kripke: Selections from ‘Identity and Necessity’

Hill: “Imaginability, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem”

Explanatory Gap

Levine: "Materialism and Qualia, The Explanatory Gap"

Mysterianism

McGinn: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?"

Return of the Dualists I

Chalmers: "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" (pp. 102-115 and 119-122)

Return of the Dualists II

Chalmers: "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" (pp. 123-135)

THIRD EXAM

Eliminative Materialism

Feyeraband: "Mental Events and the Brain" and "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem" (sections 1-9)

Churchland: "Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States" (pp. 52-55)

Eliminative Materialism II

Churchland: "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes"